Subject
authenticity (poetry vs. verse); otherworldliness; professorship
From
Date
Body
Dear All,
I do not doubt that authenticity, as D.H. Tracy and Matthew Roth suggest,
could be usefully applied to evaluation of poetry, but the concept seems in
danger of being at least superficially linked with “sincerity,” which as we
know was a bĂŞte noire of VNÂ’s, presumably because it downplayed the role of
the conscious effort of the creative artist in assimilating the
sophisticated and far from simple language of art. And thatÂ’s where VNÂ’s
words about “Pale Fire” the poem being “the hardest stuff [he] ever had to
compose” (Vintage Intl’s SO, p. 55) become especially relevant. VN thought
he must trace this “vulgar absurdity” (that art is simple and sincere) to
its source. “A schoolmarm in Ohio? A progressive ass in New York?” (Vintage
IntlÂ’s SO, p. 33). Actually, Matthew Arnold argued that criticism (granted,
not art) must be “sincere, simple, flexible, ardent, ever widening its
knowledge” (his essay, originally a lecture, “The Function of Criticism at
the Present Time” (1864) in Poetry and Criticism of Matthew Arnold,
Riverside Editions, p. 258). I guess if we wanted to define the “sincerity”
in ArnoldÂ’s sense, it would fall somewhere in between authenticity and
another concept of ArnoldÂ’s, disinterestedness.
Apropos of Peter DaleÂ’s informative comments on VNÂ’s otherworldly logic,
itÂ’s interesting to remember that Samuel Beckett expressed similar ideas.
Cf.:
In conversations with Harvey the crucial antinomy becomes that of “being”
and “form”, with Beckett insisting that a true expression of being in this
world would entail the elimination of form (form considered as order). The
task thus becomes one of breaking up the formal order of language, which
makes up our thoughts and memories in its own image, to see what remains.
(Justin Beplate, “Beckett remembering himself”, TLS, April 19, 2006)
By BeckettÂ’s own admission, usually nothing remains, silence. Even though
James Knowlson does not mention Wittgenstein in his 1996 biography of
Beckett, other have noticed certain affinities between WittgensteinÂ’s
philosophy and BeckettÂ’s views on art (Adriaan van der Weel & Ruud Hisgen).
However, Beckett’s views were eminently posyustoronniye (“thisworldly”).
Finally and somewhat belatedly, to Carolyn: IÂ’m a grad student, not a
professor. But IÂ’m glad you found my article useful.
Best regards,
Sergey Karpukhin
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I do not doubt that authenticity, as D.H. Tracy and Matthew Roth suggest,
could be usefully applied to evaluation of poetry, but the concept seems in
danger of being at least superficially linked with “sincerity,” which as we
know was a bĂŞte noire of VNÂ’s, presumably because it downplayed the role of
the conscious effort of the creative artist in assimilating the
sophisticated and far from simple language of art. And thatÂ’s where VNÂ’s
words about “Pale Fire” the poem being “the hardest stuff [he] ever had to
compose” (Vintage Intl’s SO, p. 55) become especially relevant. VN thought
he must trace this “vulgar absurdity” (that art is simple and sincere) to
its source. “A schoolmarm in Ohio? A progressive ass in New York?” (Vintage
IntlÂ’s SO, p. 33). Actually, Matthew Arnold argued that criticism (granted,
not art) must be “sincere, simple, flexible, ardent, ever widening its
knowledge” (his essay, originally a lecture, “The Function of Criticism at
the Present Time” (1864) in Poetry and Criticism of Matthew Arnold,
Riverside Editions, p. 258). I guess if we wanted to define the “sincerity”
in ArnoldÂ’s sense, it would fall somewhere in between authenticity and
another concept of ArnoldÂ’s, disinterestedness.
Apropos of Peter DaleÂ’s informative comments on VNÂ’s otherworldly logic,
itÂ’s interesting to remember that Samuel Beckett expressed similar ideas.
Cf.:
In conversations with Harvey the crucial antinomy becomes that of “being”
and “form”, with Beckett insisting that a true expression of being in this
world would entail the elimination of form (form considered as order). The
task thus becomes one of breaking up the formal order of language, which
makes up our thoughts and memories in its own image, to see what remains.
(Justin Beplate, “Beckett remembering himself”, TLS, April 19, 2006)
By BeckettÂ’s own admission, usually nothing remains, silence. Even though
James Knowlson does not mention Wittgenstein in his 1996 biography of
Beckett, other have noticed certain affinities between WittgensteinÂ’s
philosophy and BeckettÂ’s views on art (Adriaan van der Weel & Ruud Hisgen).
However, Beckett’s views were eminently posyustoronniye (“thisworldly”).
Finally and somewhat belatedly, to Carolyn: IÂ’m a grad student, not a
professor. But IÂ’m glad you found my article useful.
Best regards,
Sergey Karpukhin
Search the archive: http://listserv.ucsb.edu/archives/nabokv-l.html
Contact the Editors: mailto:nabokv-l@utk.edu,nabokv-l@holycross.edu
Visit Zembla: http://www.libraries.psu.edu/nabokov/zembla.htm
View Nabokv-L policies: http://web.utk.edu/~sblackwe/EDNote.htm